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1. Introduction 
‘This time it’s different’ was the ambitious official 
slogan of the European Parliament for the 2014 
pan-European elections. Was it really different? 
Was the slogan too ambitious? Are European 
Parliament elections still second-order elections? 
Many scholars uphold the classic view that 
European elections are second-order national 
contests.1 In 2014, however, the elections were 
indeed different. For the first time in the history 
of the European elections, most European 
political parties nominated a candidate for the 
Commission presidency. Following their 
nomination, the lead candidates launched their 
campaigns, which were in many ways similar to 
traditional national election campaigns. We 
could thus propose that the 2014 EU elections 
pioneered a tradition of ‘indirectly electing’ the 
president of the European executive, as in most 
European countries with parliamentary regimes.2 
Consequently, the conditions for a breakaway 
from the second-order election were already 
palpably present. Given this state of affairs, I 
believe we are shifting towards a type of 
‘supranational first-order elections’. The 2014 
European elections were the first step, and the 
Spitzenkandidat experience was more crucial 
than many academics argued in their papers. 
This policy brief is not intended to formulate 
the ‘magic potion’ needed to transform the next 
EU elections. Modestly, its main objective is to 
make some proposals for gradually remodelling 
the European elections into genuine ‘first-order 
elections’. I will put forward the main proposals 
for improving EU election turn-out and I will 
explore the ways in which EU elections can 
generate genuine interest from European 
Starting from the idea that European 
elections cannot be considered as 
purely second order elections, the 
author gathers some proposals in order 
to encourage a more effective electoral 
process. According to the author, if 
political leaders adopt these reforms, it 
could transform gradually the European 
elections into genuine ‘first-order 
supranational elections’. 
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citizens. In my view, these proposals are the 
most urgent and constructive considerations for 
the next EU elections in 2019. 2019 is 
tomorrow: if we really want ‘first-order’ EU 
elections, we have to start now. 
What’s wrong with the European elections? 
Since 1979, participation has steadily decreased, 
reaching an abstention level of 57.5% in 2014.3 
Paradoxically, we have witnessed an inverse 
correlation between the falling turn-out for the 
European elections and the increasing 
empowerment of the Parliament. Therefore we 
may assume that the new competences adopted 
by the Parliament after each treaty have not 
improved the legitimacy of the EU in the eyes of 
its citizens. Moreover, the results of each 
European election show that governing parties 
lose and small opposition parties win. After the 
first European direct elections, Reif and Schmitt 
defined EU elections in a theoretical framework 
as second-order elections because no 
government is created as a result of them, so less 
is at stake for voters, journalists or parties.4 
State of play after the 2014 EU elections 
Given 2014’s results, the second-order elections 
model did appear to be a relevant theoretical 
framework for analysing EU elections.5 
However, some nuances should be observed in 
order to reconsider the nature of any second-
order pattern in European elections. 
One of the main elements of the definition of 
second-order elections is that their turn-out is 
lower than that of first-order elections. In 
analysing this empirical data, we observe that 
participation in European elections has 
decreased from 62% in 1979 to 42.54% in 2014.  
However, the level of abstention in Europe 
between 1989 and 2014 indicates that national 
legislative elections have lost on average 9.5% of 
voters, while the turn-out for the European 
elections has decreased by 15.87%.6 While the 
level of abstention is high for the Parliamentary 
elections, we can distinguish the same trend at 
national level. Moreover, the turn-out for the 
last European Parliamentary elections marked a 
limited decrease comparable to the 1989 EU 
elections. Last but not least, the EU 2014 
election’s impact has considerably increased 
citizens’ impression that their voice counts in 
the EU, and it enhanced their self-identification 
as European citizens.7  In other words, we see a 
propensity for EU citizens to believe that they 
influence EU policies when they vote. 
The lack of awareness among voters of the real 
impact of their votes is seen as one of the 
reasons for low participation in EU elections. 
Most scholars tend to explain that the general 
public simply does not understand how their 
votes will change the political orientations of the 
EU. Nonetheless, the results of the 
Eurobarometer published in October 2014 
reveal that the last European elections boosted 
the feeling among a significant proportion of 
Europeans that their voice counts in the EU.8  
Another characteristic of second-order elections 
is their effect on political parties and their 
electoral performance: at EU level, larger parties 
perform worse than smaller parties, and vice 
versa at national level. Also, in many situations, 
governing parties end up losing more votes in 
the European Parliamentary elections than their 
opposition.9 According to Reif and Schmitt, in 
second-order elections, voters go to polls in 
order to express their views to another level of 
power (the national level). In other words, EU 
citizens make use of the European elections to 
express their views for or against their national 
governments.10 Yet data show us the opposite: 
only 19% of EU voters at the last EU elections 
voted in order to express approval or 
disapproval of their national government.11 
The 2014 European Parliamentary elections 
have shown significant gains for eurosceptic 
parties (generally small parties). They won seats 
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in 23 out of 28 Member States, while 
government parties in 20 of the 28 Member 
States lost votes. Even if we analyse the result of 
the EU elections as a whole, we still have to 
admit that governing parties and mainstream 
parties continue to enjoy a large share of the 
votes and they continue to be the biggest parties 
in the Parliament. This reality stands as a 
counterargument to those who claim that the 
latest EU elections were mainly a rejection of 
the European project. Moreover, small and 
extremist parties are still a minor part of the EU 
Parliament.12  
In addition, authors like Michael Marsh and 
Hanspeter Kriesi find no evidence of a 
particularly successful pattern of performance 
among extremist parties. Extremist parties from 
both ends of the political spectrum often take a 
more anti-European stance than centrist parties. 
The authors claim that, leaving aside the success 
of some parties that only contest European 
Parliament elections, anti-EU parties on average 
do much better in European elections than in 
national elections.13 
Finally, if EU elections are not yet as relevant to 
European citizens as national elections, it seems 
to be more difficult to define the European 
Parliamentary elections as purely second-order 
elections. Indeed, European elections are 
moving towards becoming a kind of first-order 
supranational election and the remaining 
question is how this will be achieved. 
2. How can a ‘first-order supranational’ 
election be facilitated? 
2.1.  The missing link: real European political 
parties 
Article 10, paragraph 1 of the Lisbon Treaty 
states that: ‘Political parties at European level 
contribute to forming European political awareness and 
to expressing the will of citizens of the Union.’ During 
each European election, you know your national 
political party, you know perhaps the name of 
your candidates, but what about the European 
political parties? The missing link between 
European citizens and EU institutions during 
European election campaigns is simply the 
actual concept of European political parties. It is 
paradoxical that we nominate a candidate for the 
presidency of the Commission from a ‘political 
family’ and yet the subsequent campaigning 
around Europe takes place without a reliable, 
visible political party.  
Most democracies are based on political parties 
that play a mediating role between citizens and 
authorities. In this sense, the best way to 
reconnect EU citizens to their European 
institutions is to form transnational actors with a 
key role in articulating the voices of citizens at 
European level and in giving real power to 
European political parties.14 
Until now, most EU citizens considered national 
parties to be powerless in the EU decision-
making process. This is why we need to create a 
clear link between the national parties and their 
affiliated European political parties. This shift 
will bear an important significance for EU 
citizens regarding decision-making in the EU. In 
a domino effect, it will increase the liability of 
the national and European political parties 
during the European electoral campaign, and 
will make citizens more aware of the 
repercussions of European elections.  
Proposal 1: Increasing the visibility of 
European political parties throughout the 
entire electoral process. 
2.2.  Individual members should be 
recognised by all European parties 
A political party gathers members on the basis 
of political affinity and political programme. It 
also puts forward for election candidates who 
represent the ideas and the vision of the party.15 
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As in national parties, members of a European 
political party structure should have the 
possibility to be active in internal decision-
making processes otherwise there is no interest 
for people to be member of them. Alas, until 
now this possibility has been limited at the 
European level to only a few parties (e.g., the 
European People’s Party). However, the Party 
of European Socialists (PES) has put together a 
list of some ‘PES activists’ from the ranks of 
party members. In parallel, the Alliance of 
Liberals and Democrats for Europe (ALDE) 
shares the same practice, all EU citizens could 
be “individual member” of the party and receive 
direct mailing from the party as well as the 
ability to express their views at congresses.  
The congresses of the parties should be the 
supreme decision-making bodies where all 
members can actively participate. Members of 
European political parties should vote for the 
manifesto of the party as well as for the main 
decisions affecting its future. Obviously, 
national or regional MPs and MEPs from the 
party can have the power of proposal. The seats 
should naturally be allocated in accordance with 
the size of members’ country of origin. 
Proposal 2: Better internal democratisation 
and more involvement of party members in 
decision-making process. 
2.3.  Primaries for the candidates for the 
presidency of the Commission 
If we have started a new procedure with 
Spitzenkandidat experience, it would be logical 
to have genuine political parties which support 
their candidates during the European campaign. 
This is why the organisation of primaries is 
paramount in ensuring that the majority of party 
members follow the candidate.  
Given that the Spitzenkandidat procedure could 
generate a long-term impact on the institutional 
balance, and could transform the Commission in 
a genuine European executive.  European 
political parties should establish specific and 
more democratic rules concerning the 
designation of their candidates. 
During the last EU elections, we witnessed a 
plethora of potential candidates advertised by 
the press, but they were, in the end, all 
nonrunners. It was clearly too risky for them to 
jeopardise their national position by starting a 
campaign to head the European executive. 
In order to avoid a sneaky manoeuvre by the 
European Parliament and the European 
Council, who decide on candidates for the 
European Commission, candidates should have 
to declare themselves well in advance. 
We could predict that the designation of 
candidates by open procedures within the 
parties would improve the Spitzenkandidat 
experience of 2014. More importantly, it would 
help candidates to become better known by EU 
citizens and thus to generate a remarkable step 
forward in involving all Europe’s citizens and 
mobilising party members. 
Proposal 3: European parties should 
designate a candidate for the presidency of 
the Commission on the basis of primaries. 
2.4.  A European election needs a European 
communication campaign 
Until now, European election campaigns could 
only be broadcasted via national political parties. 
Member States need to allow political broadcasts 
by the European political parties in order to 
circumvent a narrow public perception of the 
candidates.16 It is also another way to 
consolidate the direct link between voters and 
European political parties. The main channels 
for achieving this goal are 1) strengthening the 
European political parties and 2) increasing their 
visibility. It is essential to make these links 
between the main actors in order to gain 
visibility in the public perception. 
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The power of money 
Whoever has the money, has the power. Until 
now, the power has remained in the hands of 
national political parties. To enable European 
political parties to fully accomplish their 
mission, the Commission has taken the positive 
step of adopting a proposal for a Regulation on 
the statute and funding of European political 
parties and European political foundations. The 
proposal aims to ensure that European political 
parties benefit from a more visible status and a 
more flexible, transparent and efficient 
framework for their funding.  
The Council adopted the new rules on the 
statute and funding of European political parties 
on 29 September 2014. The rules cover a 
regulation aimed at helping European political 
parties and their affiliated political foundations 
to play their role in expressing the political will 
of EU citizens, and a regulation adjusting the 
financial regulation to the specific needs of 
European political parties.  
The first regulation will provide EU-level legal 
status for European political parties and their 
affiliated political foundations, aiming to 
increase their visibility and EU-wide recognition. 
An independent authority located within the 
European Parliament will grant this legal status. 
The authority may also impose financial 
sanctions on European political parties and their 
foundations in the event of infringements of the 
regulation. The regulation also contains 
provisions governing the funding sources of 
European political parties and their foundations. 
The second regulation adds specific rules on 
contributions from the EU budget to European 
political parties.  
The negotiations were difficult. Hopefully, these 
new regulations will be effective, starting 1 
January 2017.17 
Proposal 4: European political parties need 
the right to run political campaigns in 
Europe under the European political name. 
2.5.  A European election needs a European 
Electoral Law 
A closer look at our electoral law for European 
Parliament elections reveals that the common 
elements are surprisingly underdeveloped. How 
can we imagine an EU-wide election held 
according to different regulations in different 
Member States? Yet this is exactly what happens 
at the European elections. 
We do not have common standards for 
nomination procedures in the Member States. In 
certain countries, this process follows very strict 
procedures, whereas in others, the decision is 
taken by the head of the party. This is an area 
where we could clearly strengthen and further 
develop the democratic process for the 
elections. 
Common voting day 
Currently, no result can be published before the 
closing time of the last election ballot in the last 
Member State, which is 22:00 in some countries. 
This practice has a consequence: European 
citizens never share a ‘common electoral 
evening’ as they do during national elections. 
Citizens are not able to see how a political 
majority is formed in Europe.  
The fact that European elections currently take 
place on different days under different rules 
generates the perception that European 
elections are still primarily national elections and 
limits the creation of a European momentum. 
One same day with polling stations closing at 
the same time would better develop the feelling 
for EU citizen to take part of a genuine 
European democratic moment within the 
continent as part of the representative 
democracy on which the EU is founded.18 
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A common voting day would generate pan-
European momentum when the results were 
made public. Of course, we know that it will be 
impossible to confirm all the results that 
evening, but nevertheless it would be possible to 
know approximately the majority in the next 
parliament. By logical deduction, it would also 
be possible to know the name of the next 
president of the Commission. 
Proposal 5: Organise European elections on 
a common day with polling stations closing 
at the same time around Europe. 
2.6.  Encouraging and facilitating 
information for voters on the affiliation between 
national parties and European political parties 
National political parties participating in the 
elections to the European Parliament should 
make publicly known ahead of elections their 
affiliation with European political parties. As 
major actor of  the European elections, 
European political parties should be clearly 
indicated on the ballots used in those elections. 
Practically, all campaign materials as well as 
communication actions and political broadcasts 
should mention the affiliation between national 
political parties and European political parties. 
Currently, when citizens enter the voting booth 
they only find the name of the national party on 
their ballot. This practice is totally correct and 
normal, but we all know that those candidates, 
once elected to the European Parliament, they 
will work in European political families. This 
logic leads us to believe that it would be very 
useful and in fact natural if the name of the 
European political party also featured on the 
ballot paper. 
This innovation would clearly put an end to the 
confusion that citizens face due to the lack of 
information on the ballot about the affiliation of 
national parties – especially given the 
Spitzenkandidat element. For clear purposes, the 
ballot sheets should exhibit the emblem and 
name of the EU-wide party to which a domestic 
party is affiliated.  
During the election campaign, the emblems of 
the European political parties should be 
disseminated and bring a European perspective 
to the collective understanding of the voters. It 
would be altogether easier for voters to develop 
a clear and consistent opinion of their European 
options. 
Proposal 6: The names and emblems of the 
European political parties appear on the 
ballot paper alongside their respective 
candidates. 
2.7.  The Spitzenkandidat experience: the 
beginning of the democratic revolution 
As Simon Hix suggests, one of the factors 
behind the low turn-out was the limited impact 
of the European elections on the EU political 
agenda, and the lack of personalisation in the 
pan-European election process.19 As highlighted 
above, the essential element of the first-order 
election definition (i.e., the direct impact on the 
executive, in this case the proposal of 
presidential candidates by the political parties) 
was successfully put into practice for the 2014 
EU elections. This was the ‘big change’ expected 
to reinvigorate the EU political landscape. In the 
same vein, we may assume that the nomination 
of candidates for the Commission presidency by 
the main European political groups, each with 
their own political agenda, is arguably a tactic 
that could contribute to the decrease of 
abstention levels.  
It is difficult to assess the impact of the 
Spitzenkandidat practice, as it took place for the 
first time last year. It is clear, however, that 2014 
created a ‘precedent’ for the next European 
elections. As with every new process in the 
electoral system, citizens and political parties 
need time to understand the new challenges and 
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the new electoral rules and mechanisms. In the 
EU context, the heterogeneity of European 
political parties can trigger consequences such as 
national parties of the same political grouping 
not supporting the same candidate for the 
Commission presidency. The fact that the 
European elections are actually 28 separate 
elections with 28 electoral processes does not 
help EU voters to understand the 
Spitzenkandidat procedure and its 
consequences. The situation in 2014 proved 
difficult to explain to EU citizens, as there were 
no clear rules. 
Indeed, President Juncker likes to say that his 
Commission is different to its predecessors 
because he was elected by EU citizens. He also 
mentions that he is aware that citizens did not 
know that they voted for him. This leads us to 
the biggest problem, as this is the reason 
national parties should ensure that their political 
broadcasts for the European Parliament 
elections inform citizens about the candidate 
they support for president of the European 
Commission and the candidate’s programme. 
In the Commissioners’ mission letters, the new 
president of the Commission stressed that he 
had received ‘a political mandate’ from the 
European Parliament. We can emphasise this as 
a clear sign of the new institutional and political 
role of the Commission. Indeed, with the first 
appointment of the Commission president by 
the Parliament, the latter can be reckoned to be 
a true political majority.  
The Lisbon Treaty contains a provision that 
enables the president of the European Council 
to negotiate with the new European Parliament 
before asking the European Council to select 
candidates. This statement is not mandatory, but 
in anticipation of 2019, the European 
Parliament should start negotiations for an inter-
institutional agreement that would cover this 
important aspect. 
It was still not clear whether a true ‘legally 
binding precedent’ had been established and 
whether this rule would apply for the next 
European elections. This procedure cannot be 
taken for granted in the future, which is why the 
participants have not called it a complete 
success. 
Indeed, many observers were sceptical about the 
‘formalisation’ of the Spitzenkandidat process 
and have reiterated that the power of 
nomination is still in the hands of the Council. 
Even the president of the European Council, 
Herman Van Rompuy, was sceptical until the 
end. So if 2014 created a ‘precedent’ with the 
Spitzenkandidat procedure, now we have to set 
it in stone and clarify Declaration 11 of the 
Treaty. In this sense, candidates to the 
presidency of the European Commission from 
European political parties will be sure of what 
exactly they are running for. 
Proposal 7: The Commission candidate of 
the party that secures the most seats in the 
Parliament will be the new president of the 
European Commission, and this should be 
translated into the Treaty in clear terms. 
A directly elected president, but which programme is 
applicable? 
One important aspect is missing from this new 
institutional evolution, and it’s essential: the 
political programme of the Commission. While 
Juncker was elected by the European Parliament 
on account of his own ‘political guidelines’ for 
the legislative term of 2014–2019, a question 
persists: will he be able to implement the 
Commission’s political agenda?  
Indeed, the European Council of June 2014 
identified ‘the strategic agenda of key priorities 
for the next five years’ that the Commission 
needs to implement. Furthermore, Jean-Claude 
Juncker designed and defended his proposal 
during the hearing preceding his investiture as 
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the new Commission president. Before the 
confirmation vote, he identified ‘ten areas’ in his 
Political Guidelines for the next European 
Commission. If we take a closer look at these 
documents, it is clear that there are strong 
convergences, and one could actually believe 
that the documents from each institution were 
drafted in parallel. Nevertheless, there is no 
institutional negotiation planned to formally 
produce a fully-fledged ‘contract for the 
legislative term’.  
It indicates that the president-elect is barely 
constrained by the Member States, and thus EU 
citizens are not sure about the materialisation of 
Juncker’s promised political agenda. In other 
words, there is still no direct link between 
European election results and European political 
action. 
Proposal 8: Formal negotiations on the 
programme and the allocation of posts 
should be added to the Spitzenkandidat 
procedure. 
3. Conclusion: EU elections – between 
first- and second-order 
To conclude, there are two main elements in 
these proposals: European political parties 
should play a genuine role during the European 
election and the European election procedure 
itself should be improved and formalized. 
Are these reforms feasible? Yes – but like all 
reforms, they need the good timing as well as 
political courage. In this sense, it is easy to see 
several counter-arguments to these reforms. 
Indeed, we can easily suppose that national party 
officials would be unhappy with handing over 
power to the European level. Moreover, in these 
rocky times for the European project, many 
observers would say that the timing is bad. But 
the question is: if it’s not the right time now, 
when will it be?  
An important thing to keep in mind is that all 
the reforms outlined above do not require a new 
treaty, and some of them are already on track. 
At least, for the reforms linked to the European 
elections procedure, some amendments to the 
treaty or substantive changes are needed.  
For the first time since direct parliamentary 
elections began, turn-out has not dramatically 
dropped. In some countries like Germany, 
where the Spitzenkandidat procedure has gained 
popularity, participation increased more 
substantially than elsewhere because the media 
coverage was higher. This phenomenon has 
created a higher propensity for voters to 
participate in true pan-European elections. The 
Spitzenkandidat procedure can contribute to the 
consolidation of a European demos, which is 
partly based on common elections and common 
results that citizens can influence in the future. 
The future of Europe has always been a political 
project and, like all political projects, it should 
be supported by public opinion. Because if we 
move towards a kind of supranational election, 
European political parties should fully 
participate in it. Those who believe that EU 
elections are still second-order elections point to 
the power of national political parties. European 
political parties should make the internal 
reforms necessary for them to be able to 
conduct a transnational European election 
campaign, and Member States should make 
reforms in order to have common rules for the 
next European elections. If good political 
decisions are taken, European elections will 
move towards a kind of ‘first-order 
supranational’ election. 
Fabian Willermain is Research Fellow at 
Egmont – Royal Institute for International 
Relations. 
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